We consider a multi-awards generalization of King Solomon's problem: k identical and indivisible awards should be distributed among n agents, k < n, with the top k valuation agents receiving the awards. Agents have complete information about each others' valuations. Glazer and Ma (1989) analyzed the single-prize (i.e., k = 1) version of this problem. We show that in the 'more than two agents' problem the mechanism of Glazer and Ma admits inefficient equilibria and thus fails to solve Solomon's problem. So, first we modify their mechanism to rule out inefficient equilibria and implement efficient prize allocation in subgame perfect equilibrium when there are at least three agents. Then it is shown that a simple repeated application of our modified mechanism will distribute k (> 1) prizes efficiently in subgame perfect equilibria without any monetary transfers in equilibrium. Finally, in the multi-awards case we relax the complete information assumption and achieve implementation of efficient allocation by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, using a generalization of Olszewski's (2003) mechanism. JEL Classification Number: D78.
if there are ties in some of the valuations. Thus, the agents who receive the prizes must have valuations among the top k ranks in at least one of the corresponding ordering of agent indexes.
To generalize the result of Glazer and Ma (1989) in the case of multiple awards requires a further analysis of their single-prize mechanism for three or more agents; they formally prove the implementation result for the two-agents problem only and in the appendix they outline a more elaborate mechanism claiming that it implements efficient allocations when there are at least three agents. It turns out that this latter claim of Glazer and Ma is not always true. There are two problems with their mechanism, one trivial and a second problem more substantial due to ties in agent valuations. As a result, Glazer-Ma mechanism results in multiple equilibria involving inefficient allocations of the prize. So, first we modify GlazerMa mechanism to complete the task of solving King Solomon's problem for a single prize and arbitrary number of agents (Theorem 1), then generalize the modified mechanism for the multiple awards problem (Theorem 2).
We also adopt the informational generalizations of Perry and Reny and Olszewski in our multiple awards case. Using a generalized version of Olszewski's (2003) mechanism efficient prize allocation is implemented when no two agents' valuations are ever tied, by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Our single-and multi-prize mechanisms for the complete information case contrast with our multi-prize generalization of Olszewski's incomplete information mechanism. First, the solution concepts are different (SPE vs. iterative deletion). Moreover, in the first two mechanisms because agents move sequentially (and thus the game has perfect information) backwards induction makes the equilibrium solution (SPE) especially attractive, while there is no such nice feature in the incomplete information version as agents move simultaneously. Finally, the first two mechanisms have the advantage of dealing with ties in agent valuations, whereas the incomplete information mechanism does not deal with ties.
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Our generalized formulation of King Solomon's problem will have the following applications. The prizes can be a fixed number of research grants of equal worth to be distributed based on the applicants' productivity unknown to the grant authority. A local government may want to award a limited number of commercial licenses to enterprizing individuals in an attempt to give their careers a start; or it may decide to distribute fixed grants for multipurpose development projects (children's park, schools, libraries, adult education etc.) among various councils who know each others' overall benefits that might result from the grants but which might be unknown to the grant awarding committee.
In the next two sections, we focus on the complete information version of King Solomon's problem and its multi-awards generalization. In section 4, we relax the informational restriction. The Appendix contains an equilibrium existence result.
Mechanisms and Results: Complete Information
The planner wants to distribute a total of k ≥ 1 identical, indivisible prizes among a set of agents, N , with cardinality n. Agents have complete information about each others' valuations. The planner does not know the agents' valuations. Each agent 's valuation, u , is from the interval [0, d] with at least one agent drawing a positive valuation.
6 The (net) utility from the award to agent is given by u − χ (or simply −χ if no award is given) where χ is the agent's monetary payment to the planner. Our implementation solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), same as in Glazer and Ma (1989) .
Initially, let us consider the mechanism proposed by Glazer and Ma for k = 1 and n > 2 (the single-prize mechanism for more than two contenders).
Glazer-Ma Mechanism. Fix any ordering of the agents and index the chosen order as 1, 2, . . . , n, which is common knowledge.
Stage 0 : Each agent l, l = 2, 3, . . . , n, announces a real number l from the interval
. . , n}. If = 0, the prize is given to agent 1.
Otherwise, proceed to Stage i, where i = 1.
Stage i: Agent i says the prize will be "mine" or "not mine." If she says "not mine," then proceed to Stage i + 1, i = 1, . . . , n − 2. If she says "mine," then proceed to Stage i.i + r, where r = 1. If at Stage n − 1, agent n − 1 says "not mine," then agent n gets the prize.
Stage i.i + r: Agent i + r says "challenge" or "not challenge." If agent i + r says "not challenge" and i + r + 1 ≤ n, then proceed to Stage i.i + r + 1; if agent i + r says "not challenge" and i + r = n, then agent i gets the prize. If agent i + r says "challenge," agent i and agent i + r each pays . Then they proceed to game γ(i, i + r). will be an equilibrium, given any SPE in the continuation game for min l =1 l > 0, so that the prize goes to agent 1 who has the lowest valuation.
Second, in the case of ties in agent valuations, the agents in Glazer-Ma mechanism can get stuck with all announcing the same high 'epsilon' in equilibrium where the prize is inefficiently awarded, if lowering of 'epsilon' by one of the agents with a higher valuation (than the inefficient winner's valuation) triggers a subgame in which some other agent gets to win the prize, as in the following example. Our modification of Glazer-Ma mechanism is as follows.
The Mechanism Γ. Fix any ordering of the agents and index the chosen order as 1, 2, . . . , n, which is common knowledge. The key points of difference between Glazer-Ma mechanism and our modification can now be summarized as follows:
• in our mechanism agents announce 'epsilon' sequentially, whereas in Glazer and Ma the nature of announcements is not clearly specified;
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• our definition of differs from that of Glazer and Ma;
• in the event of disagreement our mechanism requires the winner to pay additionally an˜ (on top of ), unlike in Glazer and Ma.
The mechanism for multiple prizes is a simple extension of the single-award mechanism and outlined next.
The Mechanism Γ k . k identical prizes are distributed by at most k-rounds application of the mechanism Γ. At the beginning, draw an agent ordering once-for-all.
Round 1.
Allocate the first unit of the prizes applying the mechanism Γ. The recipient of the prize, the challenger if there is a claim and a challenge, and any agent who does not claim the prize when it is her turn to claim -all leave(s) the game at the end of the first round. Proceed to the next round.
Round 2. Allocate the second unit of the prizes once again applying the mechanism Γ for the order, inherited from the first round, with respect to the agents who survived the first round. Similar to round 1, the recipient of the second prize, the challenger if there is a claim and a challenge, and any agent not claiming 7 The assumption that agents' valuations are bounded is not essential in the construction of the mechanism Γ. The only role of the upper bound, d, is in defining˜ when = 0. If d is unbounded, keep the mechanism Γ same as above except that whenever = 0 agent is not allowed to proceed beyond Stage 0 and the bids in the game, γ(i, i + r), can be any non-negative real number. 8 Since they do not formally analyze the case of many agents, the ambiguity about the nature of announcements remained.
the prize on her turn -all leave(s) the game at the end of the second round.
Proceed to the next round.
• The following definitions are in the context of any subgame at the beginning of a round with τ more prizes left, 1 ≤ τ ≤ k.
Definition 1 An agent is deserving if she merits a place among top τ ranks for at least one ordering of the remaining agents' indexes arranged in a decreasing order of valuations.
An agent is surely deserving if she merits a place among top τ ranks for all ordering of the remaining agents' indexes arranged in a decreasing order of valua-
tions.
An agent is marginal if she is deserving but not surely deserving.
An agent is undeserving if she is not deserving.
Note that if m = τ where m is the number of deserving agents, then all the deserving agents are also surely deserving.
Theorem 1 (Single-prize implementation) Suppose there are n ≥ 2 number of contenders for a single prize. In every SPE of the mechanism Γ, the award goes to the deserving agent placed 'last' in the agent order ('last' among all deserving agents). Moreover, no agent pays any monetary transfers to the planner.
In the case of multiple awards problem, Γ A,τ denotes any subgame starting in a round k − τ + 1 with remaining agents A ⊂ N and τ prizes to be distributed. Let ∫ τ (0 ≤ ∫ τ ≤ τ ) be the number of surely deserving agents in this subgame.
Theorem 2 (Multiple awards implementation) Consider SPE. In any subgame Γ A,τ for any A and 1 ≤ τ ≤ k, τ prizes are distributed as follows:
Each surely deserving agent will receive a prize.
9 Γ k is simply a subgame Γ A,τ , where A the set of all n agents and τ = k.
If more than τ agents have positive valuations then any remaining prizes will be received by τ − ∫ τ marginal agents strictly in the reverse order from the last; if less than τ agents have positive valuations and thus the marginal agents have zero valuations, the remaining prizes will be received by some τ − ∫ τ marginal agents.
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Finally, no agent pays any monetary transfers.
In both Theorems 1 and 2, the recipient(s) of the prize(s) is (are) uniquely determined by the order of agents. 11 This implies, if the planner has some strict preference ordering over who should receive the prize(s) when there are ties in agent valuations, he would like to place the agents in an order exactly opposite to his preferred ranking.
Theorems 1 and 2 may hold vacuously. In the Appendix we outline strategies to ensure that an equilibrium exists.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
For any strategy profile and any round, suppose is announced in that round by agent . Denote agent 's virtual valuation in that round (which is her net utility in the challenge game if she wins the prize) by
By definition, ϑ can be negative. Note that virtual valuation does not take into account the initial > 0 that an agent will incur for entering into the challenge game.
Lemma 1 Consider any SPE σ of Γ k . For any subgame of Γ k , the continuation strategy profile given by σ is such that a claim will be challenged by an agent in any round only if her virtual valuation in that round is positive and weakly exceeds the claimant's virtual valuation in that round.
Proof. The challenger's virtual valuation must be positive for her to be willing to pay a positive for entering into the challenge game.
10 For any τ −∫ τ marginal agents, there will be at least one SPE such that these marginal agents each receive a prize. 11 Except in the special situation of the multi-awards problem where less than k agents draw positive valuations.
To show the second result, suppose not. Suppose there is an equilibrium such that in the j-th round subgame, agent i with virtual valuation ϑ i claims a prize and is challenged by some agent i + r whose virtual valuation is ϑ i+r , and ϑ i+r < ϑ i .
As per mechanism rule, both i and i + r pay > 0 each and proceed to play the game γ(i, i + r). Now, by a similar argument as in Glazer and Ma (see case (1) in the proof of their Theorem 2) the claimant i will bidû i = ϑ i+r and the challenger i + r will bidû i+r = 0, and the prize will go to claimant i. But then agent i + r would have been better off not to challenge agent i and save > 0, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 Fix any SPE σ of Γ k . Then there does not exist a subgame such that the continuation strategies of σ prescribe a claim to be followed by a challenge.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is some equilibrium σ of Γ k such that it results in agent i claiming a prize to be later challenged by agent i + r in some subgame.
Then by Lemma 1, in that round ϑ i+r ≥ ϑ i and moreover ϑ i+r > 0. As agent i + r challenges, both i and i + r pay > 0 each and proceed to play γ(i, i + r).
Suppose ϑ i+r > ϑ i . But then by a similar argument as in case (2) Proof of Theorem 1. Consider any SPE strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ). Denote the deserving agent placed 'last' (among all deserving agents) by index j. By the assumption that at least one agent draws a positive valuation, u j > 0. First, we claim that agent j will win the prize.
Suppose not, so that agent j's equilibrium payoff is non-positive. Denote the equilibrium announcements at Stage 0 by ( ).
Let agent j deviate to another strategy σ j that is otherwise identical to the equilibrium strategy σ j except that:
(1) announceˆ j such that
(2) always challenge; and (3) always claim.
Following agent j's deviation to σ j , letˆ be the modified taking into account any follow-up changes to , > j. Clearly, 0 <ˆ ≤ˆ j . Next we check agent j's payoffs if she deviates, taking others' strategies as given.
Since the mechanism Γ is same as Γ 1 , Lemma 2 rules out claim by any agent < j followed by challenge by another agent < j. So if some agent claims before agent j, by challenging agent j will win in the bidding game γ( , j) because
inequality follows from (1.i)) and case (2) of Theorem 2 of
Glazer and Ma would apply. Agent j's overall payoff is then u j −ˆ j −ˆ ≥ u j −2ˆ j > 0 (the last inequality follows from (1.iii)).
Next, check agent j's payoff from claiming the prize (given that no agent < j claims). For > j, condition (1.ii) implies u j −ˆ j > u ≥ 0 so that j's virtual valuation is positive and exceeds the virtual valuation of every undeserving agent to follow. Thus, if agent j is challenged, she will win in the bidding game γ(j, ) (by case (1), Theorem 2, Glazer and Ma) and her overall payoff will be u j −ˆ j −ˆ , which is already shown to be positive; otherwise agent j receives the prize unchallenged and gets a positive payoff.
Thus, by deviating agent j will always receive positive payoffs, contradicting that she will not win the prize.
Finally, since by Lemma 2 there can be no disagreement in equilibrium, neither agent j nor any other agent pays any monetary transfers to the planner. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose in any final round subgame ΓÃ ,1 for anyÃ ⊂ N with only one prize left to be distributed, at least one agent inÃ has a positive valuation. By Theorem 1, in any equilibrium of ΓÃ ,1 the deserving agent placed 'last' (among all deserving agents) will win the prize without paying any monetary transfers.
12 Clearly, u j − u > 0.
Next, in any subgame Γ A,τ for any A ⊂ N , denote by W(A, τ ) the union of ∫ τ surely deserving agents and the 'last' τ − ∫ τ marginal agents in the agent order. Now assume the following hypothesis is true: Fix any 1 ≤ τ ≤ k − 1. In any subgame Γ A,τ for any A ⊂ N , of whom at least τ agents have positive valuations, every member of W(A, τ ) will win a prize without paying any monetary transfers.
Then consider any subgame Γ A ,τ +1 for any A ⊂ N , of whom at least τ + 1 agents have positive valuations. We will argue that every member of W(A , τ + 1)
will win a prize without paying any monetary transfers.
Suppose not. Since by Lemma 2 there can be no disagreement in equilibrium, our contraposition implies that for some A ⊂ N and some subgame Γ A ,τ +1 , some agent f ∈ W(A , τ + 1) will win a prize. This, in turn, implies some agent ρ ∈ W(A , τ + 1) is not going to win any prize in this subgame so that her payoff must be non-positive in the subgame. Consider the following strategy σ ρ by agent ρ in subgame Γ A ,τ +1 :
• σ ρ is otherwise the same as her equilibrium strategy if the number of prizes left is less than or equal to τ ; and
• in the subgame with τ + 1 prizes, agent ρ's strategy, σ ρ , is again otherwise the same as her equilibrium strategy except that:
(1) at Stage 0 of the first round of the subgame agent ρ announcesˆ ρ such that
14
(2) challenge only claims by agents whose virtual valuations are strictly less than her new virtual valuation u ρ −ˆ ρ ; (3) always claim.
We now check agent ρ's payoffs when σ ρ is chosen in the subgame.
No agent < ρ with virtual valuations below that of agent ρ will claim in the initial round: agent ρ will challenge any such claim and win to receive a positive payoff, by condition (1.iii). Given condition (1.i), any agent < ρ who would
13 Such an must be undeserving so that u ρ − u > 0. 14 u ρ > 0 by the assumption that at least τ + 1 agents have positive valuations.
possibly claim is one with a higher valuation than that of agent ρ,is also surely deserving and therefore a member of W(A , τ + 1). Since agent ρ is not going to challenge any such claim, she will proceed to some subgame Γ
A,τ
where A ⊂ A \ and be a member of W(A, τ ). But then by our hypothesis agent ρ will win a prize without paying any monetary transfers.
No agent > ρ will challenge ρ's claim in the first round of the subgame. Why?
If ∈ W(A , τ + 1) then it must be that u ρ > u , which, by condition (1.ii), implies that agent will lose in the bidding game to follow (ϑ ρ > ϑ ). Therefore agent will not challenge. On the other hand, if ∈ W(A , τ + 1) then agent knows that by not challenging agent ρ and thus proceeding to any subgame Γ A,τ , where A ⊂ A \ ρ, she will be a member of W(A, τ ) and therefore receive a prize without paying any monetary transfers (by hypothesis). So, by not challenging, agent additionally saves > 0.
Thus, by deviating agent ρ will receive positive payoffs, contradicting that f will win a prize.
Our hypothesis is true for τ Otherwise agent ρ's virtual valuation will be higher. 16 If a surely deserving agent does not win a prize then equate her deviation strategy with the deviation strategy σ ρ of agent ρ, defined above, to obtain a contradiction.
prizes will be received by some τ − ∫ τ marginal agents. Finally, Lemma 2 ensures that no agent pays any monetary transfers to the planner. Q.E.D.
Relaxing Informational Restriction
In this section, we analyze the multiple awards problem but under less than complete information assumption: Each agent knows her own valuation plus the identity of the top k valuation agents but not their exact valuations (with the exception of her own valuation, if she happens to be one of them). As before, the planner wants to give k prizes to the top k valuation agents. This is a further generalization of the single-prize problem studied by Perry and Reny (1999) , and Olszewski (2003).
Our analysis below will be based on Olszewski's paper.
Let us start with the following preliminary assumption:
Assumption 1 It is commonly known that there exists some δ > 0 such that
Assumption 1 would be valid if, for example, each agent's valuation is drawn from a finite set and no two sets have nonempty intersection. Clearly, the assumption will hold in other situations as well. 17 Later on this assumption is relaxed.
The following mechanism, which is a generalization of Olszewski's single-prize mechanism, will distribute k prizes efficiently.
The Mechanism M.
Each agent says "mine" or "not mine."
If exactly k agents say "mine" then each such agent is awarded a prize and the rest get zero payoffs.
If more than k agents say "mine," each agent gets a zero payoff.
If less than k agents say "mine" then all agents participate in a (k + 1)th-price sealed-bid auction, defined as follows. Arrange the bids in a descending order: any two agents' bids will differ by at least δ, thus there will be no ties. So the agents' payoffs can be described by the following matrices.
Any deserving agent 's payoff ( placed along the Row and 'other agents' placed along the Column) is:
18 k or more say mine k − 1 say mine less than k − 1 say mine
Any undeserving agent 's payoff ( placed along the Row and 'other agents' placed along the Column) is:
k or more say mine k − 1 say mine less than k − 1 say mine
When is deserving (i.e., among top k valuation agents), clearly saying "mine" is a weakly dominant strategy. When is undeserving (i.e., not among top k valuation agents), saying "not mine" is a weakly dominant strategy because u (k) − δ > u (by Assumption 1 and the fact that is undeserving). Thus, the top k valuation agents will say "mine," the rest say "not mine," and the prizes go to the top k valuation agents.
Similar to Olszewski we now relax the assumption of common knowledge lower bound on the difference in valuations, by using some real-valued random variable C such that the probability of C > r is positive for every real number r.
18 Any agent knows whether she is deserving or undeserving because she knows the identity of the top k valuation agents.
If u (k+1) < C < u (k) then gets a prize and her payoff is u − C + u (k+1) < u ;
If u (k+1) < u (k) < C then does not get any prize and her payoff is u (k+1) < u .
Denote the expected payoff to agent ≤ k in the bidding game (plus the receipt from the planner) by E (B). Clearly E (B) < u . Now we can summarize agent 's payoff in the modified mechanism in the following matrix:
Next, consider any undeserving agent > k. Agent will not win any prize in the bidding game, so her payoffs in the modified mechanism can be summarized as follows:
For ≤ k (i.e., deserving), clearly saying "mine" is a weakly dominant strategy. On the other hand, for > k (i.e., undeserving), saying "not mine" is a weakly dominant strategy. Thus, the modified mechanism will implement efficient allocation of k prizes.
The implementation result in this section under weaker assumption about agents' information depends crucially on the basic assumption that there is no possibility of a tie in any two (or more) agents' valuations. The same is also true of Olszewski (2003), and Perry and Reny (1999) . In contrast, our results in section 2 allow for possible ties.
Appendix
Theorems 1 and 2 are about equilibrium characterizations. Below we outline strategies to guarantee that an equilibrium exists.
Let Ω = {l > |u l < u }.
Recall, Γ A,τ is the subgame with only τ more prizes left, 1 ≤ τ ≤ k, for any set of remaining agents A. Also, let W(A, τ ) be the union of ∫ τ surely deserving agents and the 'last' τ − ∫ τ marginal agents in the agent order, as defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
• The strategy of any ∈ A such that u > 0 in the first round of any subgame Γ A,τ is as follows, where throughout l ∈ A:
(A.1) announce in that round to satisfy We shall sketch this proof by considering the choices of in the first round of Γ A,τ backwards starting with the choices in the challenge game of this round.
Before outlining the sketch, note that if the above strategies are implemented, then in any subgame Γ A ,τ the set of agents who receive the prizes is W(A , τ ). In our arguments below, throughout l ∈ A.
• In the challenge game, the specified strategies will be optimal as in Glazer and Ma.
• Let us check whether agent will enter the challenge game or not, assuming that in the continuation game everyone else follows the above strategies.
For τ = 1, clearly the strategy of when to challenge is optimal. So consider τ > 1. Suppose that some agent l < claims.
If either (2) or (3) does not hold then clearly it is optimal for agent not to challenge, and hence not to enter the challenge game. Next suppose ∈ W(A \ l, τ −1). Given the order of agents in A, label the agents in W(A\l, τ −1) in reverse order z 1 , z 2 , . . . up to agent . The last agent, z 1 , will not challenge l, because then either l remains unchallenged or is challenged by some k > z 1 , k ∈ W(A \ l, τ − 1)
and in either case z 1 will receive a prize in a later round without paying monetary transfers (note that W(A \ l, τ − 1) = W(A \ {l, k}, τ − 1)). Agent z 2 will not challenge l either, because after her only a member outside W(A \ l, τ − 1) (such as k) might challenge l, and z 2 will then receive a prize without paying monetary transfers. Repeating this argument backwards, ∈ W(A\l, τ −1) will not challenge l. Therefore will not enter the challenge game.
Next, suppose ∈ W(A \ l, τ − 1), and (2) and (3) hold. It is not difficult to see that ∈ W(A \ {l, k}, τ − 1) for any k > who challenges l in the continuation game, because then k ∈ W(A\l, τ −1) so that W(A\l, τ −1) = W(A\{l, k}, τ −1).
But then because is not a member of W(A\l, τ −1), by letting go the opportunity to challenge the claim by l agent will receive zero payoff. But by conditions (2) and (3), agent can obtain a non-negative payoff by challenging l. So it is optimal for agent to challenge.
• Next we check whether it is optimal for agent to claim, assuming that in the continuation game everyone else follows the above strategies.
For τ = 1, clearly the strategy of when to claim is optimal. So consider τ > 1.
Suppose for some l > , l ∈ W(A \ , τ − 1), both ϑ l ≥ ϑ and ϑ l − ≥ 0. By definition of (A.3), agent l will challenge a claim by agent and l will win in the challenge game. Therefore agent will not claim.
On the other hand, if ∀l > , either l ∈ W(A \ , τ − 1) or (1) holds then no such l will challenge (by definition of (A.3)). So it is optimal for agent to claim.
• The optimality of the announcement strategy (A.1) can be demonstrated using similar arguments to that in Theorem 2 proof. Q.E.D.
